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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been well ingrained in all of us that what is fair is
generally right, and what is unfair is wrong. We are all familiar with
the notion that we cannot have our cake and eat it, too. How far does
that sense of fairness extend? Should it take precedence over other
public policy concerns which have helped to shape our laws and
justice system? These questions have plagued the courts in the
context of patent law and assignment agreements.' The following
hypothetical situations help illustrate the dilemma.
Consider an inventor who acts fraudulently in obtaining a patent,
which he then assigns to Company A. Can that inventor assert an
inequitable conduct defense to render the patent unenforceable when
he is later charged with infringement by Company A?
What about an inventor who assigns her patent to Company A,
knowing that a prior art reference exists which will likely invalidate
the patent? Can she defeat Company A's infringement allegations by
invalidating the patent with that same prior art reference?
What about the case of an inventor who assigns his patent and
subsequently discovers a previously unknown prior art reference
which he believes invalidates the patent? Should the inventor be
allowed to allege invalidity based on that prior art reference in
defense of an infringement action?
Alternatively, what if Company A, who was assigned the patent
by Inventor, subsequently assigns the patent to Company B? Should
Company A be prohibited from attempting to invalidate the patent by
using a prior art reference discovered after it had assigned the patent
to Company B?
Finally, issues arise when corporate employees are part of a team
of inventors. For example, an employee-inventor assigns his
invention to Company A as required by his employment agreement,
signs the inventor's oath to accompany a patent application which he
1. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(stating that "[a]t least five other courts have indicated their belief that assignor estoppel is no
longer the prevailing rule of law." (citing Coastal Dynamics Corp. v. Symbolic Displays, Inc.,
469 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Contour Chair Lounge Co. v. True-Fit Chair, Inc., 648
F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 543 F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Marvacon Indus. v. Thermacon Indus., 209 U.S.P.Q. 932 (D.N.J. 1980); Nat'l Welding
Equip. Co. v. Hammon Precision Equip. Co., 165 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Cal. 1958)) and that "[a]t
least two courts have acknowledged the doctrine, although rejecting on the facts its application
to the cases before them." (quoting Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 458 F. Supp. 828, 840,
192 U.S.P.Q. 95, 105 (M.D. Fla. 1976), affd 584 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1978); Brand Plastics Co. v.
Dow Chem. Co., 267 F. Supp. 1010, 1013, 154 U.S.P.Q. 140, 142-43 (C.D. Cal. 1967), affd in
part, rev 'd in part, 475 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1973))).
2004]
800 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 20
did not prepare, and then leaves Company A while the patent is being
prosecuted. Is he prevented from challenging the validity of any
patent which ultimately issues from the initial application? What
about his subsequent employer, Company B, who thought enough of
the employee-inventor to place him in charge of its infringing product
line?
It is easy to review the first scenario and determine that the
inventor should not be able to avoid infringement by claiming that the
patent he assigned is unenforceable as a result of his own conduct.
Similarly, it seems reasonable that the employee inventor in the final
hypothetical should not be prevented from arguing that a patent
prosecuted and obtained by his former employer is invalid, nor should
his subsequent employer. But where should the line be drawn in the
other scenarios? Should a non-inventor assignor be held to the same
standards as an inventor assignor?
The courts have used the doctrine of assignor estoppel to help
answer these questions, but its interpretation has not been consistent.2
The doctrine of assignor estoppel is a reflection of our fundamental
sense of fair play, the notion that one cannot undermine the value of
that which she conveyed by later challenging its worth. More
specifically, assignor estoppel precludes an assignor of a patent from
attacking the novelty, utility, or validity of the patent as a defense to a
charge of infringement.3 The doctrine was originally adopted from
the British common law,4 but has not always found favor with the
courts. In fact, the United States Supreme Court spent the better part
of the twentieth century slowly eroding the doctrine until it was
effectively rendered nonviable.5 The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, on the other hand, took up the gauntlet and has revived the
doctrine.6 However, the broad application of the doctrine advocated
by the Federal Circuit raises concerns about, among other things,
patent law policies and employer-employee relationships and rights.
2. See id.; Amber L. Hatfield, Life After Death for Assignor Estoppel: Per Se
Application to Protect Incentives to Innovate, 68 TEX. L. REv. 251, 264, 268 (1989).
3. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 252 (1945).
4. Hatfield, supra note 2, at 259-60 (citing Oldham v. Langmead, 2 Wils. 374 (1789)).
5. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 666 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1227; Shamrock Tech., Inc. v. Med.
Sterilization, Inc., 903 F.2d 789, 793, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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II. ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL AND ITS JUSTIFICATION
1. The Doctrine ofAssignor Estoppel
The doctrine of assignor estoppel, simply stated, precludes a
patent assignor from attacking the validity of the assigned patent as a
defense to a charge of infringement.7 Assignor estoppel represents
one embodiment of the age old principle that one should not be able
to sell something on the one hand, and at the same time, try to hang
on to it with the other.
This principle was first applied to patents by the English courts
in the late eighteenth century, which held that having assigned his
rights in a patent the inventor could not subsequently avoid
infringement by arguing the patent was invalid.8 The Supreme Court
adopted this notion in the mid-nineteenth century in Kinsman v.
Parkhurst, where the Court held that equity prevents one from
avoiding one's obligations under an assignment contract by arguing
that the subject of the contract-the patent-was invalid.9
2. The Rationale Behind Assignor Estoppel
Various justifications have been offered for applying assignor
estoppel, the most common of which are: (1) to prevent unfairness
and injustice; (2) to prevent one from benefiting from his own wrong;
(3) by analogy to estoppel by deed in real estate; and (4) to preserve
the equities of contract.' 0 Regardless of which justificatory reasoning
is espoused, however, the fundamental concept is the same: to
promote fairness.
For example, the Federal Circuit has applied assignor estoppel
on the grounds of fairness and justice, holding that a patent assignor
cannot later assert that what he conveyed was not, in fact, a patent."
Similarly, other courts have relied on the principle that an assignor
cannot escape allegations of infringement by asserting that the patent
is invalid due to the assignor's own misdeeds.' 2 The courts have also
analogized assignor estoppel to estoppel by deed, which prohibits a
grantor of a deed of land from challenging the value of the land or
7. Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 252.
8. Hatfield, supra note 2, at 258.
9. 59 U.S. 289, 293 (1856).
10. Hatfield, supra note 2, at 260; see Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1223-26.
11. See, e.g., Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1224.
12. See, e.g., Kinsman, 59 U.S. at 293.
2004]
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title. 13 In relying on contract principles, the courts have held an
assignor should not be allowed to avoid the assignment contract by
arguing that he in effect conveyed nothing. 1
4
Whichever rationale is relied upon, the gist of the argument is
the same: an assignor cannot have his cake and eat it too. Although
this principle of fairness strikes a chord in all of us, it does not
necessarily follow that it should dictate all our dealings. There are
other factors which sometimes weigh more heavily on our decisions.
In the case of assignor estoppel, the Supreme Court recognized that
concerns such as the patent law policies took precedence, and
therefore justified severely curtailing the doctrine. Though assignor
estoppel has been brought back to life by the Federal Circuit, the
concerns raised by its application are no less relevant today.
III. THE EVOLUTION AND DEMISE OF ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL
Assignor estoppel is a judicially created doctrine developed by
the early British courts and adopted by the American judicial system.
In 1856, the Supreme Court approved the application of estoppel in a
patent dispute,' 5 but proceeded to chip away at the doctrine of
assignor estoppel until, in 1969, it voiced its belief that the doctrine
was no longer viable.16
1. The Early Cases on Patent Estoppel
The doctrine of assignor estoppel as it exists in American
jurisprudence has its origins in the Supreme Court's decisions in
Kinsman v. Parkhurst17 and Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully,18
both of which addressed the general idea of patent estoppel.
The question before the Court in Kinsman was whether a co-
owner of a patent through assignment could avoid his contractual
obligations to account for his profits on the patented product by
seeking to invalidate the patent. 19 Parkhurst was the inventor of an
improvement to a cotton gin machine and had been granted a patent
13. Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1225 (citing Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v.
Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1924)).
14. Westinghouse, 266 U.S. at 350.
15. Kinsman, 59 U.S. at 293.
16. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
17. Kinsman, 59 U.S. at 293.
18. 144 U.S. 224 (1892).
19. Kinsman, 59 U.S. at 292-93.
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on his invention. 20 After obtaining his patent, Parkhurst entered into
an agreement with Kinsman, who gained a one-third ownership of the
patent; under the agreement, the pair jointly manufactured and sold
the patented machines.21  After approximately one year, the two
renegotiated their arrangement, and Kinsman agreed to stop
manufacturing and selling the patented machines.2E  Kinsman
continued to manufacture and sell the machines in violation of the
agreement, however, so Parkhurst filed suit seeking an accounting for
profits made from the sale of the patented machines.23 In the suit,
Parkhurst obtained a preliminary injunction against Kinsman
prohibiting further sales. 4 Kinsman then transferred his business to
Goddard, a clerk in his business, who continued to manufacture and
sell the patented machines. 5 Parkhurst amended his complaint to
name Goddard as an additional party.2 6
On appeal, Kinsman and Goddard challenged the validity of the
patent, alleging that Parkhurst was not the first inventor of the
claimed invention.27 The Court refused to decide the question of the
validity of the patent, and instead held that Kinsman and Goddard
were estopped from alleging invalidity.28 The Court reasoned that the
validity of the patent did not affect the profits Kinsman and Goddard
had received on the patented machines, and thus, the profits could not
be used to avoid an accounting. Specifically, the Court stated that:
[e]ven where money has been received, either by an agent or a
joint owner, by force of a contract which was illegal, the agent or
joint owner cannot protect himself from accounting for what was
so received, by setting up the illegality of the transaction in which
it was paid to him.2
9
The rationale behind the Court's decision was fairness. Having
made a profit by making and selling machines under the protection of
the patent, Kinsman could not be allowed to deny the validity of that
20. Id. at 290.
21. Id. at 291-92.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. 289, 292 (1856).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 293.
29. Id.
2004]
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patent and subsequently keep the profits he derived under the
umbrella of its protection.30
Almost forty years later, in Pope Manufacturing Co. v.
Gormully, the Court again considered patent estoppel. Upon
reviewing the case, it determined that the policies behind the patent
laws overrode any other concerns, and that a patent licensee could not
contractually agree not to challenge the validity of a patent. 3'
Gormully had licensed several patents from Pope Manufacturing
subject to certain conditions, e.g. Gormully would not infringe any of
the specified non-licensed patents and would not challenge their
validity. 32  Pope Manufacturing sought to specifically enforce the
contract, but the Court refused to do so because the provision at issue
was against public and patent policies.
It is as important to the public that competition should not be
repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really
valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly; and it is a
serious question whether public policy permits a man to barter
away beforehand his right to defend unjust actions or classes of
actions, though, in an individual case, he may doubtless assent that
a judgment be rendered against him, even without notice. 33
Ultimately the Court concluded that "[w]ith regard to all such
matters of public policy, it would seem that no man can bind himself
by estoppel not to assert a right which the law gives him on reasons of
public policy., 34  This reasoning was to remain a theme with the
Court well into the twentieth century.
2. The Supreme Court Undermines the Assignor Estoppel
Doctrine
Though numerous lower courts had applied the doctrine of
assignor estoppel since the time of Pope Manufacturing, the Supreme
Court did not address the specific question of assignor estoppel until
30. Id.
31. 144 U.S. 224, 233 (1892) (stating that "[t]he real question is whether the defendant
can estop himself from disputing patents which may be wholly void, or to which the plaintiff
may have no shadow of title.").
32. Id. at 224 n. 1 (The contract provision at issue stated that Gormully would not infringe
the non-licensed patents, "nor in any way, either directly or indirectly, dispute or contest the
validity of the [patents], or either of them or the title thereto of [Pope], but will aid and morally
assist [Pope] in maintaining public respect for and preventing infringements upon the same.").
33. Id. at 234.
34. Id. at 235 (quoting Crane v. French, 38 Miss. 503, 532 (1860)) (alteration in
original).
Vol. 20
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its decision in Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v.
Formica Insulation Co. 35 in 1924. At that time, the Court
acknowledged that assignor estoppel had become "the general rule,"
but it found reason in the patent laws to create an exception to the
rule.36
Westinghouse employed a mechanical engineer, O'Connor, who
invented a method for manufacturing composite electric insulation
materials.3 7  In accordance with his employment agreement,
O'Connor assigned his invention to Westinghouse, and with the help
of Westinghouse's legal department, he prepared a written disclosure
for Westinghouse that was used in the patent application.38 O'Connor
left Westinghouse while the application was pending in order to form
a new partnership. 39 That partnership was ultimately incorporated as
the Formica Insulation Company, and it manufactured articles using
the claimed method.4 °
In deciding the case, the Court noted that assignor estoppel
required that "an assignor of a patent right [be] estopped to attack the
utility, novelty or validity of a patented invention which he has
assigned or granted as against any one claiming the right under his
assignment or grant, 'Al and stated that it "[would] not now lightly
disturb a rule well settled by forty-five years of judicial consideration
and conclusion. , 42 Such constraints did not deter the Court from
limiting the well-established rule, however.
In applying the doctrine, the Court followed the example of
several lower courts and analogized assignor estoppel to estoppel by
deed. Estoppel by deed prevents a grantor of a deed of land from
later challenging the title to that property.43 Similarly, assignor
estoppel works to prevent a patent assignor from subsequently
attacking the validity of the patent.4  Significantly, the Court found
the estoppel by deed analogy to be imperfect: while the boundaries of
a tract of land are easily identified, the same cannot be said for the
35. 266 U.S. 342, 349 (1924).
36. Id. at 353,355.
37. Id. at 345.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 346.
40. Id.
41. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 349 (1924).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 350.
44. Id.
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scope of a patent.45 The analogy fails to an even greater extent when
the assignment is made before the patent issues.
When the assignment is made before [the] patent [is granted], the
claims are subject to change by curtailment or enlargement by the
Patent Office with the acquiescence or at the instance of the
assignee, and the extent of the claims to be allowed may ultimately
include more than the assignor intended to claim. This difference
might justify the view that the range of relevant and competent
evidence in fixing the limits of the subsequent estoppel should be
more liberal than in the case of an assignment of a granted
patent.
46
Though the Court declined to decide whether a more liberal
standard might apply in the case of a pre-issue assignment, it held
that, regardless of the timing of the assignment, the assignor was
permitted to use the state of the art "to construe and narrow the claims
of the patent. ''47 While the Court believed that its revision of the rule
might be a nice distinction, it felt it was also a workable one.4 8
The Court's state of the art exception allowed assignors to use
the state of the art to narrow claim scope by identifying those
elements which were not new, and thus, not assigned.49 This enabled
an assignor to avoid infringement if he did not practice the new
elements. In Formica, the result of applying this exception was that
O'Connor and Formica were able to effectively narrow the scope of
the claims and avoid infringement without having to address the
validity of the patent since their method did not include the inventive
elements.5 °
The upshot of the Court's decision in Formica was that although
an assignor could not directly attack the validity of the assigned
patent, the prior art could be used to the same effect to narrow the
scope of the claimed invention so as to avoid claims of infringement.
It would be another twenty-five years before the Supreme Court
returned to the question of assignor estoppel, in Scott Paper Co. v.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 353 (emphasis added).
47. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 351 (1924).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 354-55. As the Court observed in a subsequent decision, "[Formica] thus
sustained the defense of noninfringement by restricting the claims by reference to the prior art,
and by holding in effect that the invention assigned was not as broad in scope as the claims
would otherwise on their face define it to be." Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S.
249,253 (1945).
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Marcalus Manufacturing Co., Inc.,'51 only to further undercut
application of the doctrine. While employed by Scott Paper,
Marcalus invented a method and machine for mounting a cutting strip
on the edge of a box blank, which he assigned to Scott Paper.52 After
the patent issued, Marcalus left Scott Paper to form his own company,
Marcalus Manufacturing, which made and sold box blanks with a
cutting edge.53 When charged with infringement, Marcalus sought to
rely on an expired prior art patent. 4 The prior art reference was not
intended to anticipate and thus invalidate the patent, but rather, to
establish noninfringement as suggested by Formica.
55
The parties disputed whether assignor estoppel as described in
Formica applied, and what the logical scope of the doctrine actually
was. 56 Scott Paper argued that the "distinction" made by the Formica
Court between using the state of the art to narrow the claims but not
invalidate them was merely semantic, and that it amounted to an
illegitimate attack on the patent's validity.57 In contrast, Marcalus
argued that the rationale of Formica should be followed to its logical
conclusion, and that an assignor should be able to narrow the scope of
the asserted claims to only those elements of the claimed invention,
whether inventive or not, which were not found in the prior art.5' The
Court in Scott Paper, however, refused to "pursue such logical
refinements," stating that, "[t]o whatever extent [assignor estoppel]
may be deemed to have survived the Formica decision or to be
restricted by it, we think that case is not controlling here. For other
considerations are dispositive of this case . . . ,59 The other
considerations to which the Court referred were the patent laws
themselves.60
As the Court noted, Congress was appointed with the task of
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, and it chose to
do so by providing for a "limited grant of the patent monopoly in
return for the full disclosure of the patented invention and its
51. Scott Paper, 326 U.S. at 249.
52. Id. at 250-51.
53. Id. at251.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 253-54.
57. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 253 (1945).
58. Id. at 253-54.
59. Id. at 254.
60. Id.
20041
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dedication to the public on the expiration of the patent., 61  In
considering the true policy behind the patent laws, the Court
determined that the laws were intended to secure for the public the
benefit of new and innovative ideas, not only by allowing inventors
the right to make or employ their ideas, but by ensuring that the
consuming public received the benefits of such open use of the
ideas.62 The Court explained how this policy impacted the doctrine of
assignor estoppel by finding:
[i]t is... apparent that the patent laws preclude the patentee of an
expired patent and all others.., from recapturing any part of the
former patent monopoly; for those laws dedicate to all the public
the ideas and inventions embodied in an expired patent.... It
follows that the patent laws preclude the petitioner assignee from
invoking the doctrine of estoppel, as a means of continuing as
against respondent, his assignor, the benefit of an expired
monopoly, and they preclude the assignor from estopping himself
from enjoying rights which it is the policy of the patent laws to
free from all restrictions.
63
Although the Court acknowledged that the doctrine had its
origins in fairness and justice,64 in view of the considerations
supporting the patent laws the Court held that even though an
assignor could not attack the validity of an assigned patent, he could
use the prior art to show that his accused product was embodied in an
expired patent.65
Notably, Justice Frankfurter dissented from the majority, arguing
that fairness and justice required application of assignor estoppel
without exception. Further, if in fact the patent laws should take
precedence, it was up to Congress to take appropriate action, not the
Court.
66
The dissent in Scott Paper notwithstanding, the apparent end of
assignor estoppel came with the decision in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins. 67 In
61. Id. at 255 (citing Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1832); Gill v. Wells, 89
U.S. 1 (1874); Bauer& CIE v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1912); and Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1916)).
62. Id.
63. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1945) (citations
omitted).
64. Id. at 251 (stating that "[i]ts basic principle is said to be one of good faith, that one
who has sold his invention may not, to the detriment of the purchaser, deny the existence of that
which he has sold.").
65. Id. at 257.
66. Id. at 258-64.
67. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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Lear, the inventor, Adkins, had licensed to his employer his
improvements to the method of manufacturing gyroscopes. 6' At the
time the parties entered into the license agreement, Adkins had filed a
patent application, but no patent had issued.69  Two years after
entering into the license agreement, and still without an issued patent,
Lear found a patent it determined anticipated Adkins' invention; so it
refused to pay further royalties under the license. 70 When the patent
finally issued, Adkins sued Lear for infringement and Lear asserted
an invalidity defense.
71
The Court addressed the question of whether Lear, as licensee,
could challenge the validity of the licensed patent.72 The Court
clearly held that the doctrine of licensee estoppel was dead, and in the
process reviewed the status of patent estoppel generally.73 In
summing up the history of patent estoppel, the Court noted that:
[d]uring [the first half of the 20th century], each time a patentee
sought to rely upon his estoppel privilege before this Court, the
majority created a new exception to permit judicial scrutiny into
the validity of the Patent Office's grant. Long before [Automatic
Radio Manufacturing Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.] was
decided, the estoppel doctrine had been so eroded that it could no
longer be considered the "general rule," but was only to be invoked
in an ever-narrowing set of circumstances.
74
The Court went on to review the restrictions imposed on the
assignor estoppel doctrine by its earlier decisions, including Formica
and Scott Paper, and specifically noted that the Scott Paper decision
had "undermined the very basis of the 'general rule' [of assignor
estoppel]. '7 5
IV. REVIVAL AND EXPANSION OF ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL BY THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Although Lear seemed to clearly say that assignor estoppel was
no longer a viable doctrine, its discussion was, in effect, dicta, as the
case specifically addressed the related doctrine of licensee estoppel.76
68. Id. at 657.
69. Id. at 657-58.
70. Id. at 659.
71. Id. at 658-60.
72. Id. at 662.
73. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969).
74. Id. at 664.
75. Id. at 666.
76. Id. at 656.
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The Federal Circuit even noted in Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico,
Inc.,7 that the Supreme Court had "sapped much of the vitality, if not
the logic, from the assignor estoppel doctrine., 78 The lower courts,
however, were not clear on what rule to apply when an assignee tried
to invoke assignor estoppel to bar an invalidity claim. Though
numerous federal courts found that the doctrine was no longer
viable,79 many still applied the doctrine to prevent assignors from
asserting invalidity defenses. The Federal Circuit responded by
reviving the doctrine with a vengeance.
In 1988, the Federal Circuit took up the issue of assignor
estoppel in Diamond Scientific. While employed by Diamond
Scientific, Dr. Welter developed a gastroenteritis vaccine for swine.
80
Dr. Welter assigned his invention to Diamond Scientific, but
continued to participate in the prosecution of the patent application,
including signing an inventor's oath.81 Shortly thereafter, Dr. Walter
left Diamond Scientific to form his own company, Ambico, and
began manufacturing a gastroenteritis vaccine for swine.
82
While chiding the Supreme Court for failing to give a clear or
definitive opinion regarding the viability of assignor estoppel, and
noting that the Court had managed to sidestep the issue each time it
arose, the Diamond Scientific court held that the doctrine still applied
and that Dr. Welter and Ambico were estopped from challenging the
validity of the assigned patents.83
The Federal Circuit acknowledged the exceptions carved out by
the Supreme Court in Formica and Scott Paper, but did not find such
precedent entirely applicable. For example, the Federal Circuit noted
77. 848 F.2d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
78. Id. at 1223.
79. Id. (stating that "[a]t least five other courts have indicated their belief that assignor
estoppel is no longer the prevailing rule of law." (citing Coastal Dynamics Corp. v. Symbolic
Displays, Inc., 469 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Contour Chair Lounge Co. v. True-Fit
Chair, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 704 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 543 F. Supp.
610 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Marvacon Indus. v. Thermacon Indus., 209 U.S.P.Q. 932 (D.N.J. 1980);
Nat'l Welding Equip. Co. v. Hammon Precision Equip. Co., 165 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Cal. 1958)).
80. Id. at 1222.
81. Id. at 1225.
82. Id. at 1222.
83. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1225-27 (1988) (stating that
"[a]lthough the doctrine of assignor estoppel may no longer be a broad equitable device
susceptible of automatic application, the case before us is appropriate for its use. When the
inventor-assignor has signed the Oath, Power of Attorney and Petition, which attests to his
belief in the validity of the patents, and has assigned the patent rights to another for valuable
consideration, he should be estopped from defending patent infringement claims by proving that
what he assigned was worthless.").
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the Court's finding in Scott Paper that application of assignor
estoppel was often in conflict with the patent laws, 84 as well as the
Supreme Court's statement in Lear that "[t]he Scott exception had
undermined the very basis of the [estoppel] 'general rule."'' 85 Neither
decision was sufficient to convince the Federal Circuit that the
doctrine of assignor estoppel was dead, though the court was reduced
to relying on several trivial differences in order to distinguish its
decision from the established precedent.
The Federal Circuit found the Lear decision not helpful as it
identified what it called "one important distinction between assignors
and licensees"-while a licensee was faced with the possibility of
paying ongoing royalties for an invalid patent, the assignor had
already been fully compensated for his patent rights.
86
The court reasoned that assignor estoppel still existed as an
equitable doctrine which worked to prevent unfairness and injustice,
and thus held that "despite the public policy encouraging people to
challenge potentially invalid patents, there are still circumstances in
which the equities of the contractual relationships between the parties
should deprive one party (as well as others in privity with it) of the
right to bring that challenge." 87  The court found this to be true
regardless of when the assignment took place, stating that an inventor
"assigned the rights to his invention, irrespective of the particular
language in the claims describing the inventions when the patents
were ultimately granted. 88
Shortly after its decision in Diamond Scientific, the Federal
Circuit expanded its position regarding assignor estoppel in Shamrock
Technologies, Inc. v. Medical Sterilization, Inc.89 While Diamond
Scientific addressed assignor estoppel as a bar to defenses of
inadequate disclosure, anticipation, and obviousness, 90 Shamrock
Technologies held that assignor estoppel also barred equitable
defenses such as inequitable conduct.
9
'
Luniewski, the joint-inventor of the patent at issue, assigned his
invention to Shamrock Technologies in accordance with his
84. Id. at 1223.
85. Id. (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 666 (1969)).
86. Id. at 1224. The flaws in this argument and others are discussed infra in Section VI. 1.
87. Id. at 1225.
88. Id. at 1226.
89. 903 F.2d 789 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
90. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1225 (1988).
91. Shamrock Techs., 903 F.2d at 794.
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employment agreement.92 Luniewski reviewed the patent application
and signed the inventor's oath, in which he attested to the
inventorship of the patent and the scope of Shamrock Technologies'
prior work in the field of the invention. 93 Luniewski immediately left
the company thereafter. 94  The inequitable conduct alleged by
defendants was, in part, that the inventor had been misled as to the
scope of Shamrock's earlier activities in the field of the invention.
95
Because the facts supporting the inequitable conduct defense were
contradicted by the inventor's declaration, the court found that "they
render[ed] the defense nonviable and the equitable doctrine of
assignor estoppel bar[red] its assertion., 96
The Federal Circuit's willingness to apply the doctrine continued
to grow in Q.G. Products, Inc. v. Shorty, Inc.,97 decided in 1993. In
this case, the court found that following a reassignment of a patent
application to the original inventor, the assignor was estopped from
attacking the validity of a patent which issued as a continuation-in-
part from the assigned application.98
Rudolphe Simon was the inventor of a device for fastening
comer strips to wall boards, and filed a patent application based on
his invention.99 While the application was pending, Simon assigned
the invention to Shorty, in exchange for $20,000 and Shorty stock.100
Three months later, Shorty reassigned the application to Simon in
exchange for $20,000 and return of the Shorty stock.'0 ' Simon
subsequently abandoned the application, but had filed a continuation-
in-part application which resulted in issuance of the allegedly
infringed patent.'0 2 In defense to the infringement allegation, Shorty
challenged the inventorship of the patent, claiming that one of the
owners of Shorty should have been named as an inventor.
10 3
92. Id. at 790.
93. Id. at 795.
94. Id. at 790.
95. Shamrock Techs., Inc. v. Med. Sterilization, Inc., 903 F.2d 789, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
96. Id. (The court did note, however, that "in a proper case general principles of equity
may preclude use of assignor estoppel to bar a viable equitable defense arising from post-
assignment events." It did not indicate what a "proper case" might be.).
97. 992 F.2d 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
98. Id. at 1214-15.
99. Id. at 1212.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Q.G. Prods., Inc. v. Shorty, Inc., 992 F.2d 1211, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL.
In finding that the equities demanded application of assignor
estoppel, the court reasoned that "[a]lthough Shorty's assignment
merely returned the parties to their pre-incorporation financial
posture, Shorty nevertheless received value for the assignment. Thus
Shorty represented that the assigned property had value."'10 4 Though
not explicitly stated by the court, the implication is that since Shorty
represented to Simon that the assigned application had value, and it
received value for the assignment, fairness and justice dictate that
Shorty cannot subsequently attack the value of that which it assigned.
Significantly, the court also found application of assignor estoppel
appropriate as the alleged basis for invalidity-the failure to identify
all inventors-was one which was known to Shorty at the time it
reassigned the patent to Simon. 10 5
Finally, the court considered whether assignor estoppel should
apply to a patent that issued as a continuation-in-part from the
assigned application. The court referred to its decision in Diamond
Scientific, where it observed that "[the assignor] assigned the rights to
his invention, irrespective of the particular language in the claims
describing the inventions when the patents were ultimately
granted."'10 6 The court went on to emphasize that the assignment was
not limited to what was disclosed in the patent application, but
embraced the entire invention. 107 In this case, the court reasoned, the
continuation patent "merely elaborate[d]" on the assigned invention,
and, as such, Shorty was estopped from challenging the validity of the
continuation patent.I°8
V. SUMMARY OF THE HISTORY AND LAW OF ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL
Despite an apparent early acceptance of the principles behind
assignor estoppel, the Supreme Court has historically disfavored the
doctrine. As of 1970, after the Supreme Court decided Lear, it
appeared that the doctrine of assignor estoppel had only a strictly
limited application, if any. The Court consistently chipped away at
the foundations of assignor estoppel for over one hundred years, until
it had managed to completely undermine the doctrine. As the Lear
Court observed, "[t]he estoppel rule was first stringently limited" in
104. Id. at 1213.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1214 (quoting Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1226
(Fed. Cir. 1988)).
107. Id. at 1214.
108. Id. at 1215.
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Formica and subsequently had its legs cut out from under it in Scott
Paper. 1
09
The landscape changed in the 1980's, however, with the creation
of the Federal Circuit and it decision to address the viability of
assignor estoppel in 1988. The court's decision in Diamond Scientific
revived the dying doctrine and gave it new life. Assignor estoppel
has been invoked with new vigor in the last twenty-five years, and the
Federal Circuit has expanded the doctrine such that it is applied more
expansively than in any time since it was first adopted by the
American courts.
VI. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S DECISIONS REPRESENT AN UNJUSTIFIED
ABOUT-FACE FROM THE POSITION ADVOCATED BY THE SUPREME
COURT
By the time the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, Supreme
Court decisions dealing with assignor estoppel had made clear that
although the doctrine might still exist, it was in name only. Relying
on the policies behind the patent laws, the Court had created sufficient
exceptions to the doctrine so as to make it unworkable. Moreover, the
Court's arguments, if taken to their logical conclusion, undermined
the foundations of assignor estoppel.
If [as asserted in Scott] patent policy forbids estoppel when the old
owner attempts to show that he did no more than copy an expired
patent, why should not the old owner also be permitted to show
that the invention lacked novelty because it could be found in a
technical journal or because it was obvious to one knowledgeable
in the art?... The Scott exception had undermined the very basis
of the 'general rule.'
01°
Such precedent notwithstanding, the Federal Circuit in Diamond
Scientific revived the doctrine of assignor estoppel. Though couching
its decision in terms of the demands of equities in the case before it,
the Diamond Scientific court effectively reversed the Supreme Court's
rulings on application of assignor estoppel. Moreover, the Federal
Circuit has continued during the past twenty-five years to expand its
application of the doctrine.
109. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 664-66 (1969).
110. Id. at 666.
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1. The Federal Circuit's Effective Reversal from Supreme Court
Precedent Was Contrived and Unwarranted
The court's attempt to distinguish the case before it from the
Supreme Court precedent was based on tenuous and sometimes
irrelevant distinctions and its arguments, in fact, run contrary to the
rationale put forth by the Supreme Court in several respects:
(1) The Diamond Scientific court argued that Lear dealt with
licensee estoppel, and, consequently, the rationale that a
licensee of an invalid patent might have to continue to
pay royalties did not apply to the assignor who had
already been paid in full.11' In doing so, however, the
Diamond Scientific court disregarded the discussion in
Lear about assignor estoppel being based on patent
policies, not royalty payments;
(2) The Diamond Scientific court applied assignor estoppel
to prevent unfairness and injustice, citing to the dissent
in Scott Paper," 2 but it ignored the majority's holding
that patent law policies were the controlling factor;
(3) The Diamond Scientific court explicitly stated that it was
not confined to application of the doctrine as analogous
to estoppel by deed. 13  As a result, it was able to
redefine the scope of the assignment as one of rights in
an invention, rather than simply the language of the
patent, and so broadened the scope of the assignment;
(4) In broadening the scope of an assignment, the court
avoided the rationale behind Formica and effectively
weakened the "state of the art" exception; and
(5) The Diamond Scientific court placed significant
emphasis on assignors signing the inventor's oath,1 14 but
ignored the practical realities associated with the oath in
the business world, where employees assign their
inventions to their employers as a matter of course and
have no real say in the actual prosecution of the patents.
111. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1225.
114. Id. at 1225, 1227.
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a. The Federal Circuit's Effort to Distinguish Diamond
Scientific from Lear Ignored the Weight of Supreme
Court Precedent
In choosing to ignore the import of the Lear decision, the Federal
Circuit justified its conclusions by distinguishing assignor estoppel
from what it perceived to be the rationale behind the holding in Lear.
Specifically, the court rationalized that:
[i]n examining Lear, one important distinction between assignors
and licensees becomes apparent-a distinction that cautions
against the automatic application to assignment cases of the
rationale underlying Lear and licensees. The public policy
favoring allowing a licensee to contest the validity of the patent is
not present in the assignment situation. Unlike the licensee, who,
without Lear might be forced to continue to pay for a potentially
invalid patent, the assignor who would challenge the patent has
already been fully paid for the patent rights.
115
While the court's statement may well be accurate, it also
completely disregards the Supreme Court's discussion about patent
estoppel generally, and its prior decisions on assignor estoppel in
particular. The Supreme Court began its discussion on estoppel, in
fact, by noting that, as early as 1892 in Pope Manufacturing, the
Court had found the doctrine of patent estoppel "inequitable."', 16 The
Court went on to discuss the limitations it had placed on the doctrine
of assignor estoppel in Formica and Scott Paper, including its refusal
in Scott Paper to sanction the application of assignor estoppel. It
concluded by noting that:
[i]f patent policy forbids estoppel when the old owner attempts to
show that he did no more than copy an expired patent, why should
not the old owner also be permitted to show that the invention
lacked novelty because it could be found in a technical journal or
because it was obvious to one knowledgeable in the art.
The net result of the Court's prior decisions was to undermine
the very basis of assignor estoppel.1 18 Moreover, this conclusion was
reached independently of any comments by the Lear court regarding
the inadvisability of requiring licensees to continue paying royalties
115. Id. at 1224.
116. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663-64 (1969) (citing Pope Mfg. Co. v.
Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892)).
117. Lear, 395 U.S. at 666.
118. Id.
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on invalid patents, making the Federal Circuit's distinction between
assignors and licensees moot.
The Federal Circuit failed to adequately address the Supreme
Court's analysis of the viability of assignor estoppel, and instead
chose to rely on the specious distinction that Lear was premised on
the inequities of a licensee paying ongoing royalties on an invalid
patent. This purported reason for disregarding the rationale of Lear is
perhaps more unsatisfactory when taken in the context of real world
transactions. For example, what happens in the case of an assignor
who also takes a license under the patent, whether as part of the
original assignment or as a result of litigation? In either
circumstance, if the assignor is estopped from challenging the validity
of the assigned patent he will be required to pay continuing royalties
on a potentially invalid patent.
b. The Federal Circuit's Reliance on the Principles of
Fairness and Justice Represent an Unjustifiable
Deviation from Supreme Court Precedent
The Diamond Scientific court emphasized the fact that its
application of the assignor estoppel doctrine was intended to prevent
unfairness and injustice.
[W]e believe that the primary consideration in now applying the
doctrine is the measure of unfairness and injustice that would be
suffered by the assignee if the assignor were allowed to raise
defenses of patent invalidity. Our analysis must be concerned
mainly with the balance of equities between the parties." 
9
In fact, the court even cites to Scott Paper to bolster its position.
Significantly, the court's reference to Scott Paper was to Justice
Frankfurter's dissent. The Federal Circuit's decision that the
prevention of unfairness and injustice override any concerns about the
patent laws and their policies as identified by the Supreme Court is a
clear deviation from Supreme Court precedent, particularly in light of
the fact that the fairness argument in favor of assignor estoppel had
previously been considered by the Supreme Court. The simple fact
that such arguments were raised in the Scott Paper dissent indicates
that the Court had considered principles of fairness and injustice at
the time it rendered its decision, and found instead that the patent
laws and the public interests they sought to protect took precedence in
the case of assignor estoppel.
119. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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It is not necessary, however, to rely on such inferences. The
Supreme Court expressly reached the conclusion that contract
principles and a sense of fairness justified application of the doctrine
of assignor estoppel, but did not operate to override legislative
authority.
It is thus apparent that the patent laws preclude the patentee of an
expired patent and all others.., from recapturing any part of the
former patent monopoly; for those laws dedicate to all the public
the ideas and inventions embodied in an expired patent. They do
not contemplate that anyone by contract or any form of private
arrangement may withhold from the public the use of an invention
for which the public has paid by its grant of a monopoly and which
has been appropriated to the use of all. The rights in the invention
are then no longer subject to private barter, sale, or waiver .... For
no more than private contract can estoppel be the means of
successfully avoiding the requirements of legislation enacted for
the protection of a public interest. The interest in private good faith
is not a universal touchstone which can be made the means of
sacrificing a public interest secured by an appropriate exercise of
the legislative power. The patent laws preclude us from saying
that the patent assignment, which they authorize, operates to estop
the assignor from asserting that which the patent laws prescribe,
namely, that the invention of an expired patent is dedicated to the
public, of which the assignor is a member.
120
The Supreme Court had also determined that the public interest
in enjoying the benefits of the patent laws overrode any potential
injustice presented by an assignor attacking the validity of the patent
he had assigned. As such, the Federal Circuit's decision in Diamond
Scientific can be nothing other than a conscious choice to ignore the
Supreme Court precedent.
c. The Federal Circuit's Holding That an Assignment is of
the "Rights" to an Invention and Not the "Language" of
the Patent Undermined the Supreme Court Decisions
on Assignor Estoppel
The Federal Circuit further justified its departure from Supreme
Court precedent by concluding that it was not bound by the Court's
analogy of assignor estoppel to estoppel by deed. "[T]he extent to
which the concept of an estoppel by deed may or may not shape the
doctrine of assignor estoppel, though it may often play a significant
120. Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1945) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
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role, need not confine our application of the doctrine." 12  The
consequence of this view of assignor estoppel as being something
greater than a patent version of estoppel by deed was to enable the
Federal Circuit to increase the scope of an assignment by redefining
just what is assigned.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Diamond Scientific is a series
of seemingly small shifts away from Supreme Court precedent which
resulted in a significant change of direction with respect to viability of
the assignor estoppel doctrine. One such subtle yet significant
distinction was the court's insistence that an assignor grants her rights
in an invention, rather than merely what is claimed in the patent.
122
The Formica Court did not frame the issue the same way the
Federal Circuit did, but its decision makes clear that the Court
considered an assignment to be the subject matter of the invention as
claimed in the patent because "[t]he grantor purports to convey the
right to exclude others.., from a described and limited field of the
useful arts." 12 3 Based on its analogy of assignor estoppel to estoppel
by deed, the Court reached this conclusion since it was necessary to
define the bounds of that which was conveyed. The Formica Court
explained the analogy, commenting that:
[t]he analogy between estoppel in conveyances of land and
estoppel in assignments of a patent right is clear. If one lawfully
conveys to another a patented right to exclude the public from the
making, using and vending of an invention, fair dealing should
prevent him from derogating from the title he has assigned, just as
it estops a grantor of a deed of land from impeaching the effect of
his solemn act as against his grantee.
124
However, the Court went on to explain where the analogy failed
and why the doctrine of assignor presented a particular problem:
The grantor purports to convey the right to exclude others, in the
one instance, from a defined tract of land, and in the other, from a
described and limited field of the useful arts. The difference
between the two cases is only the practical one of fixing exactly
what is the subject matter conveyed. A tract of land is easily
determined by survey. Not so the scope of a patent right for an
invention. 125
121. Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1225.
122. Id. at 1226.
123. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Fornica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 350 (1924).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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Moreover, the Court's further comments made clear that
estoppel's scope was even more limited as to pre-patent issue
assignments than in the case of post-issue assignments.
126
The Federal Circuit, on the other hand, determined that an
assignment was of the rights in an invention, and was not strictly
limited by the language of the patent. Once the Federal Circuit
determined that it was no longer confined to the estoppel by deed
analogy, it felt free to redefine the scope of an assignment. If
assignor estoppel is not strictly a patent version of estoppel by deed,
then it is not necessary to define the bounds of the assignment by
reference to the claims. Once the court no longer considered an
assignment to be defined by the patent claims, it was free to consider
assignor estoppel in a new light. Thus, it defined an assignment to be
of the rights in an invention, unconstrained by the patent language.
As a result of this broadened definition of assignment, not only was
the court able to limit the "state of the art" exception to assignor
estoppel pursuant to the doctrine, it also proceeded to apply assignor
estoppel in increasingly wider sets of circumstances.
d. The Federal Circuit's Redefinition of the Scope of an
Assignment Allowed the Court to Weaken the Supreme
Court's Exceptions to Assignor Estoppel
In looking beyond what it considered to be the narrow estoppel
by deed analogy, the Federal Circuit was able to weaken the
exceptions to assignor estoppel created by the Supreme Court in
Formica and Scott Paper.
First, the Supreme Court's reliance on the estoppel by deed
analogy led to its conclusion that the scope of an assignment, i.e. the
claims, needed to be defined, which in turn led the Court to create its
first notable exception to assignor estoppel.127 Specifically, the Court
determined that an assignor, although estopped from attacking the
validity of the assigned patent, could rely on the "state of the art" at
the time of the assignment to narrow and construe the claims, thus
potentially avoiding infringement. 1
28
The Federal Circuit weakened this "state of the art" exception by
determining that an assignment was of an inventor's rights in an
invention, rather than the invention as claimed in the language of the
126. Id. at 353.
127. Id. at 342.
128. Id. at 351.
ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL
patent. 129 If assignor estoppel was not limited by the scope of the
construed claims, but was instead found to incorporate all aspects of
his "inventions" regardless of whether they were expressly described
in the patent, then it was of little benefit to an assignor to try to
narrow the scope of the claims.
The Formica Court's "state of the art" exception was further
limited by the Federal Circuit's position as to the timing of the
assignment. Though the Supreme Court intended the exception to be
equally if not more applicable in the case of a pre-issue assignment,
the Federal Circuit held the reverse to be true.1 30  Specifically,
Formica expressly declined to restrict its "state of the art" exception
to assignor estoppel based upon the timing of the assignment. "We
can well be clear, however, that if it is proper to limit the estoppel
available for an assignee after patent as against his assignor by
reference to the state of the art, a fortiori is such reference relevant
where the estoppel is sought by the assignee before patent."'
31
In contrast, the Federal Circuit interpreted this exception as
applying only to amendments made after assignment.
To the extent that Diamond may have broadened the claims in the
patent applications (after the assignments) beyond what could be
validly claimed in light of the prior art, [Formica] may allow
appellants to introduce evidence of prior art to narrow the scope of
the claims of the patents, which may bring their accused devices
outside the scope of the claims of the patents in suit.1
32
In deciding that it was irrelevant whether the patent had issued at
the time of the assignment in question, the Diamond Scientific court
relied on its asserted premise that the inventor assigned "the rights to
his invention, irrespective of the particular language in the claims
describing the inventions when the patents were ultimately
granted."' 3 3  As evidenced by the Federal Circuit's subsequent
decisions, this distinction significantly expanded the scope of the
estoppel defense. For example, in Q.G. Products, where an assignee
had reassigned a patent application to the original inventor, the
assignor was prohibited from challenging the validity of a
continuation patent. The court reasoned that the continuation claimed
an invention developed prior to the original assignment, even though
129. Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
130. Id.
131. Westinghouse, 266 U.S. at 353.
132. Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1226.
133. Id.
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not expressly claimed in the original patent application, and therefore,
it was included in the original assignment of the rights to the
invention. 1
34
In short, by deciding that it was not limited by the Supreme
Court's analogy of assignor estoppel to estoppel by deed, the Federal
Circuit opened the door for a drastic change of direction in the
evolution--or extinction-of the doctrine. One consequence of this
doctrinal shift was that the "state of the art" exception was severely
curtailed.
e. The Federal Circuit's Emphasis on the Signing of the
Inventor's Oath is Unwarranted and Misplaced
The linchpin of the Federal Circuit's argument that the
prevention of unfairness and injustice require application of assignor
estoppel is that the inventor-assignor signed an inventor's oath.
When the inventor-assignor has signed the Oath, Power of
Attorney and Petition, which attests to his belief in the validity of
the patents, and has assigned the patent rights to another for
valuable consideration, he should be estopped from defending
patent infringement claims by proving that what he assigned was
worthless.
The court's holding is an unsettling statement of the law for
several reasons, including its disregard for the scope of an assignment
as set forth in Formica as well as the practicalities of the patent
assignment and prosecution processes.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that the
inventor's oath is simply a declaration by the inventor that he has read
the application and that, to the best of his knowledge at the time of
signing, he is the original and first inventor of the subject matter of
the application. 136 In so saying, however, the inventor is not required
134. Q.G. Prod., Inc. v. Shorty, Inc., 992 F.2d 1211, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
135. Diamond Scientific, 848 F.2d at 1226.
136. 37 C.F.R. § 1.63 (2002), which states in relevant part that:
(a) An oath or declaration filed under § 1.51 (b)(2) as a part of a nonprovisional
application must:
(2) Identify each inventor by full name, including the family name, and at
least one given name without abbreviation together with any other given
name or initial;
(4) State that the person making the oath or declaration believes the
named inventor or inventors to be the original and first inventor or
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to do any type of prior art search to confirm his belief. The inventor's
oath is not a warranty as to the patentability of his invention, nor a
guarantee as to the scope of the claims which may or may not
ultimately issue from the patent application.1
37
As discussed in more detail above, the Diamond Scientific
decision represents a significant deviation from the Supreme Court's
analysis in Formica. According to Formica, what is assigned is
defined by the actual scope of the claims as issued, and as construed
in view of the state of the art at the time of the invention.' 38 The
Diamond Scientific court's reliance on the signing of the inventor's
oath as the circumstance requiring application of assignor estoppel,
follows not from the rationale of Formica, but rather, from its
assertion that an inventor assigns the rights to her invention. Where
the scope of the assignment cannot be determined until after the
claims have issued and subsequently been construed in view of the
state of the art, the inventor's oath plays little part in determining
what has been conveyed. Where an inventor's rights in an invention
are conveyed, however, the Federal Circuit construes the oath as a
further attestation by the inventor as to the value of the invention
which she has assigned.
As discussed in greater detail below, at Sections VII. 2. & 3., the
Federal Circuit's reasoning also appears to ignore the practicalities of
assignment within the employer-employee context. The assignment
agreement is in effect signed at the time the employee is hired. The
assignment of any specific invention is little more than a technicality.
Similarly, the application accompanying the inventor's oath is one
which has more often than not been prepared by the employer, with
varying degrees of input from the actual inventor. Given the nature of
the oath as a fairly meaningless formality of employment, it is
inventors of the subject matter which is claimed and for which a patent is
sought.
Section 1.63 further requires that the person making the declaration state that s/he has reviewed
and understands the contents of the application, including the claims. See also, e.g., General
Information Concerning Patents, a pamphlet published by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/generaVindex.html
(last visited Mar. 17, 2004). ("The inventor must make an oath or declaration that he/she
believes himself/herself to be the original and first inventor of the subject matter of the
application, and he/she must make various other statements required by law and various
statements required by the USPTO rules.").
137. Hatfield, supra note 2, at 268-69.
138. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 350-51
(1924).
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difficult to understand the importance placed by the Federal Circuit
on the oath.
2. The Federal Circuit's Decisions After Diamond Scientific
Have Further Expanded the Doctrine of Assignor Estoppel
and Curtailed Any Exceptions
While the Diamond Scientific court brought the doctrine of
assignor estoppel back from the brink of death, subsequent Federal
Circuit decisions have only served to further expand the application of
assignor estoppel. For instance, in Shamrock Technologies, the
Federal Circuit held that assignor estoppel helped prevent assignors
from relying on equitable challenges to the validity of a patent. "We
reject the contention that mere classification of a defense as equitable
bars consideration of assignor estoppel."'
' 39
In Q. G. Products, the Federal Circuit found that an assignor of a
patent application who had reassigned the patent to the original
inventor was estopped from attacking the validity of a continuation
patent. 140 The court relied on Diamond Scientific's holding that an
assignment is of the inventor's rights in an invention, finding that the
invention claimed in the continuation is subject to an assignment of
the inventor's rights to his invention, even though not expressly
described in the claims of the assigned parent application.
The Federal Circuit also found that assignor estoppel must apply
in actions before the International Trade Commission.14 1  The
administrative law judge who originally heard the case found that
application of the doctrine would be inequitable due to the potentially
significant adverse effect on third parties not involved in the dispute.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, however, stating that "both statutory
and case law required that assignor estoppel be considered and
applied."'
142
Moreover, despite the court's suggestion in Diamond Scientific
that the "state of the art" exception created in Formica might still be
available, the court seems unwilling to apply such exceptions to an
assignor's benefit. For example, in Q.G. Products, the court used the
state of the prior art, including the inventor's own disclosures, to
139. Shamrock Tech., Inc. v. Med. Sterilization, Inc., 903 F.2d 789, 794 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
140. Q.G. Prod., Inc. v. Shorty, Inc., 992 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
141. Intel v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
142. Id.
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broaden the scope of the assignment, as opposed to limiting it to only
the novel elements of the claimed invention.
143
VII. THE PRACTICAL CONCERNS AND EFFECTS OF APPLICATION OF
ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL
The Federal Circuit's revival and expansion of the doctrine of
assignor estoppel presents several practical problems for inventors,
employees, and employers. Employees must consider reserving their
right to challenge the validity of a future patent, but are in no position
to insist on such a provision. Similarly, employers must consider the
inherent risks involved when hiring an employee to take charge of a
product which is subsequently charged with infringing a patent
invented by that same employee while at another company. Such
concerns only serve to hinder the goals of the patent laws-to
promote the progress of the sciences and useful arts-but have failed
to overcome the Federal Circuit's sense of fair play as promulgated
through the application of assignor estoppel.
1. The Doctrine of Assignor Estoppel Creates Warranties in
Assignment Contracts Not Necessarily Intended By the
Assignor
The assignor estoppel doctrine, particularly the Federal Circuit's
holding that an assignment is of an inventor's rights in his invention
and not of the language of the claims, and its emphasis of the
importance of the inventor's oath, creates warranties in assignment
contracts that the parties did not necessarily intend to include. The
court's take on assignor estoppel in effect turns a simple assignment
agreement into an absolute, and effective, warranty as to the validity
of not only the patent, but the inventor's rights in his invention,
whether claimed or not. Such guarantees go far beyond the terms of
the typical assignment agreements.
By prohibiting an assignor from subsequently challenging the
validity of the assigned patent, assignor estoppel functions as a
judicially imposed warranty that the patent is valid. This warranty
applies whether the assignment occurs before or after the patent
issues, and despite the fact that the assignor cannot legally know the
true scope of the claims or what prior art could invalidate those
claims. Similarly, the effective warranty does not consider whether
the inventor was familiar with the relevant prior art at the time of
143. Q.G. Prod., 992 F.2d at 1214.
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assignment, which is often not the case, and is even more unlikely in
the case of a preinvention assignment.
As a preliminary matter, it is questionable whether an assignor
can legitimately waive his right to challenge the validity of the
patent. 144 As early as 1892, the Supreme Court recognized that there
are certain rights which cannot be waived, and indicated that the
public's right to free competition was one such right. The Court held
that
[i]t is as important to the public that competition should not be
repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really
valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly; and it is a
serious question whether public policy permits a man to barter
away beforehand his right to defend unjust actions or classes of
actions .... 145
Under the rubric created by the Federal Circuit, however, an
assignor is presumed to do precisely that: waive a public right. The
doctrine of assignor estoppel prevents an assignor from defending an
infringement action by attacking the asserted patent's validity, which
effectively introduces a waiver of an assignor's right to defend a
potentially unjust action into any given assignment of patent rights.
Further, it seems the best way for an assignor to avoid being
bound by such unintended warranties is to expressly reserve the right
to assert an invalidity defense. 146 Insistence on inclusion of such an
express reservation in an assignment agreement, however, is likely to
cause undesirable tension between the parties to the assignment as the
implication is that the assignor anticipates an infringement suit in the
future.
More importantly, not all assignors are in a position to insist on
such a provision. Within the employer-employee context, the
employee will rarely have the bargaining power to insist on the
requisite reservation. Assignment in the employment context is a
routine occurrence, and the prospective employee is given little or no
choice in the matter. In fact, such preinvention agreements to
assignment are, for most employees, required. 147 Consequently, under
the assignor estoppel doctrine, an employee who develops patentable
144. See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892).
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quicktum Design Sys., Inc., 150 F.3d 1374, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
147. Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention
Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REv. 595, 617 (1993).
ASSIGNOR ESTOPPEL.
subject matter will become bound by warranties as to validity and
enforceability where she had no opportunity to avoid such contractual
obligations other than by declining employment.
This absurdity is only made more apparent when one recognizes
that the assignment was effectively made before any invention was
even conceived, and that the subsequent assignment document is
simply a formality. In such circumstances, the employee-inventor is
effectively placed in a position of having to warrant the validity and
enforceability of an invention that he had not yet even conceived.
The Federal Circuit's emphasis on the significance of the inventor's
oath does nothing to mitigate the contradictions inherent in the
doctrine.
An employee's obligations under an employment assignment
agreement generally include executing any papers necessary to the
prosecution of any patent application filed by one's employer,
including the inventor's oath. Moreover, the application
accompanying the inventor's oath is one which has more often than
not been prepared by the employer, with varying degrees of input
from the actual inventor. As one commentator noted, "[r]ealistically,
the Oath is largely a statutory formality. The inventor must only
attest to his 'belief in the validity of the patent.' An inventor's belief
about patent validity means little if the inventor knows nothing about
the prior art, which is likely in cases of employee-inventors." '1 48
In view of such realities, it is hard to justify the broad use of
assignor estoppel advocated by the Federal Circuit, which noted that
"[d]ue to the intrinsic unfairness in allowing an assignor to challenge
the validity of the patent it assigned, the implicit representation of
validity contained in an assignment of a patent for value raises the
presumption that an estoppel will apply."'
149
2. The Judicially Created Assignor Estoppel Warranties Are
Even More Troubling in the Context of Mandatory
Preinvention Assignments
The most common form of assignment is between an inventor-
employee and his employer. These assignments, sometimes referred
to as preinvention assignments, are a common part and often
mandatory condition of employment in today's market. 150 In signing
a preinvention assignment agreement upon being hired, an employee
148. Hatfield, supra note 2, at 269.
149. Mentor Graphics, 150 F.3d at 1378.
150. Cherensky, supra note 147, at 617.
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is generally agreeing to assign any future work-related inventions to
his employer.
Though some of the inconsistencies associated with preinvention
assignments are discussed above, one significant difficulty is that
these agreements are arguably contracts of adhesion. Employees are
not offered an opportunity to negotiate the terms of the preinvention
assignment agreements, and must simply accept the agreement "as is"
if they want the job position offered. This is particularly true in a
depressed job market where competition for a limited number of
positions is intense. "As a result, most commentators agree that
freedom of contract does not generally exist in the employee-inventor
context."151
Consequently, in addition to reading into assignment agreements
an improper waiver of an assignor's right to challenge an unjust
infringement action, the Federal Circuit is doing so in situations
where the assignor has not even had an opportunity to negotiate the
terms of the assignment contract and cannot be considered to have
knowingly warranted the validity of any future inventions.
3. The Federal Circuit's Broad Application ofAssignor
Estoppel Has Unsettling Implications for Employers and
Employees
The Federal Circuit's position on assignor estoppel has
disturbing implications, particularly in an open and fluid
technological culture such as the Silicon Valley. Much of the Silicon
Valley's success, and the resultant technology explosion, is the result
of high tech workers' considerable job mobility. This flexibility is
due in large part to California's unfair competition laws, and the
151. Id. at 621 n. 117 (quoting John P. Sutton, Employment Contracts, in LEGAL RIGHTS
OF CHEMISTS AND ENGINEERS 45, 58, 62 (Warren D. Niederhauser & E. Gerald Meyer eds.,
1977):
A contract of adhesion occurs when the terms are prepared entirely for the benefit
of one of the parties, and the other party does not have sufficient bargaining
power to alter the terms. Today the employment contract is a contract of
adhesion. Whether it is enforceable or not depends on whether it is
unconscionable....
.. The problem is that unless you are a Nobel Laureate you are not going to
get fair provisions into the contract. It's bargaining power that gets fair contract
provisions.... Those in demand, like corporation presidents, can write their own
tickets. Most employees cannot.).
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restrictions placed on the use and enforcement of non-compete
agreements. 152
Such flexibility of employment is threatened, however, by the
Federal Circuit's application of assignor estoppel. While under
California law an employee is free to leave one employer to work for
its competitor, such movement is discouraged where the new
employer is faced with the possibility that in hiring the employee, the
employer will have potentially disastrous consequences in the form of
assignor estoppel.
Consider the situation in which Employee, as part of an
employment agreement, assigns an invention to Company A but then
decides to go work for a new employer, Company B, who competes
with Company A. After Employee leaves, Company A obtains a
patent on Employee's inventions, most likely without Employee ever
knowing whether the claims issued or what their scope might be. In
the mean time, Company B has put Employee to work on a product
that is subsequently charged with infringing Company A's patent. If
Company B is found to be in privity with Employee, 153 then Company
B will be estopped from attacking the validity and enforceability of
the patent simply because Company B hired Employee and made use
of his expertise in a position of some responsibility.
The potential for such damaging consequences must create
greater caution and disincentives for employers to hire individuals
who have a wider experience and have proven themselves to be
creative and productive workers. Such consequences serve only to
punish those individuals who have proven the most inventive as they
suddenly become less desirable employees due to the potential for
disaster that trails them.
On the flip side of the coin, employees will want to try to be
more careful about the terms of their employment, particularly
requirements that they assign any inventions to their employers.
Absent an express reservation of the right to challenge the validity of
152. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §16600 (Deering 1992 & Supp. 2003) which states that:
"Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging
in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void."
153. The determination of whether an employer is in privity with an employee for assignor
estoppel purposes is an equitable one, and depends on the closeness of the relationship between
the two, including financial interests and the responsibilities of the employee. See, e.g., Intel v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating that "[w]hat is
significant is whether the ultimate infringer availed itself of the inventor's 'knowledge and
assistance' to conduct infringement." (citing Shamrock Tech., Inc. v. Med. Sterilization, Inc.,
903 F.2d 789, 794 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
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an assigned invention, as discussed above, an employee must face
potential future complications as a result of preinvention assignment
agreements. However, the employee is generally not in a position to
negotiate for such a reservation. As a result, the employee is faced
with the dilemma of jeopardizing immediate employment by holding
out for such a reservation or else hampering future employment
opportunities by finding himself unmarketable in his field because of
the shadow of assignor estoppel hanging over his head.
In sum, the Federal Circuit's position on assignor estoppel is
counterproductive to the express purposes of the patent laws: to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts. An employee
forced to sign a preinvention assignment agreement will have no
incentive to create or invent as doing so brings him little or no benefit
nor any additional compensation from a current employer, and will
only harm his chances of future employment and advancement.
Similarly, employers may be discouraged from hiring the most able
employees as they are the ones most likely to land the employer in a
compromising position.
4. It is Unclear Whether Assignor Estoppel Would Apply to
Proceedings Before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office
There is little question that if an assignor is charged with
infringement in the federal courts that he will be precluded from
attacking the validity of the patent in suit. This is so even if the
assignor has discovered a potentially invalidating prior art reference.
But what if the assignor chooses instead to challenge the patent's
validity through other channels, specifically the United States Patent
and Trademark Office?
Pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 302 and 37 C.F.R. §1.510, any person
may request reexamination of a patent based on a written prior art
reference. A third party - including an assignor - can submit a
request for reexamination to the PTO, which will then decide if there
is a substantially new question of patentability and, if so, will agree to
reexamine the patent. In effect, an assignor can use PTO procedures
to attempt to do what the federal courts will not allow: to invalidate
the patent. The difficulty arises in that a decision to reject a patent on
reexamination based on a prior art reference can ultimately be
appealed to the Federal Circuit.1
5 4
154. 35 U.S.C. §§ 141,306 (2000).
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So what happens if the assignor decides to file a request for
reexamination with the PTO so as to avoid the federal courts and the
assignor estoppel doctrine? Further, if the PTO declines to apply the
assignor estoppel doctrine, would the Federal Circuit be free to do so
in the event that the patent owner appeals a rejection on a
reexamination filed by an assignor?
Generally speaking, the fact of concurrent or even prior litigation
on a patent subject to reexamination is not determinative in the PTO
proceeding. 155 For example, the PTO is not bound by any finding by
a federal court that a patent is valid.1 56 The PTO must consider the
patent claims in view of the prior art reference itself, as different
standards of proof are used by the PTO than the federal courts. 57
Similarly, the PTO will not stay reexamination pending the outcome
of litigation unless it is notified of a federal court decision
invalidating the patent.'58
Different standards of proof notwithstanding, it seems likely
courts must decide that assignor estoppel prevents an assignor from
requesting reexamination given the Federal Circuit's current broad
application of the doctrine. This is particularly true because the
Federal Circuit already required that the International Trade
Commission apply assignor estoppel in accordance with federal court
decisions. 59
VIII. CONCLUSION
Though assignor estoppel had appeared to be a doctrine that had
seen the end of its life, the Federal Circuit, seemingly in direct
contravention of Supreme Court precedent, has revived the doctrine
and raised it to new heights. The Federal Circuit's broad application
of assignor estoppel, however, and its strict adherence to principles of
fairness and justice, have not only resulted in the assignee receiving
more than he bargained for in the form of an implied absolute
warranty as to the validity of the patent, but has also created a
doctrine which seems to discourage exactly that which the patent laws
are supposed to encourage: the progress of science and the useful arts.
155. 37 C.F.R. § 1.565 (2002); see also Manual of Patent Examination Procedure, § 2286,
U.S. Dep't of Commerce (8th ed. 2003).
156. Manual of Patent Examination Procedure, § 2286 (citing Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d
1422, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
157. Manual of Patent Examination Procedure, supra note 156, §§ 2242, 2286.
158. Id. § 2286.
159. Intel v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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Though the Supreme Court has not yet opted to share its own
thoughts on the matter, in this era of high employee mobility, it seems
clear that the current extreme interpretation of assignor estoppel will
ultimately lead to a conflict that cannot be ignored.
